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Introduction
In ibis article an attempt will be made to review briefly the rôle of population
growth in economie growth theory and to make a few critical remarks on the
applied methodology and the underlying assumptions. Emphasis is laid on the
possible relationships between population and economie growth in the developing
countries, but also Malthus' theory and the stagnationists' of the 1930's will be
discussed in order to acquire a better understanding of the development in this
field.
1. The classical economists
A fixed supply of natural resources, especially land, which limits the productivity
of a larger labour force and thus of per capita food supplies of an increasing pop-
ulation was the central thème of Malthus' theory. Taking the quantity of land as
fixed this would lead to a confrontation of the geometrie rate of growth of popu-
lation with the arithmetic rate at which subsistence could grow at best. Conse-
quently, population always tended to outrun the available supply of food products.
In fact, Malthus did not say that population would increase at a geometrie rate
of growth. It was only its tendency if left unchecked. He assumed that 'positive'
checks (pestilence, famine and war) and 'préventive' checks (moral restraint with
prudent postponement of early marriages until a f amily could be supported) would
limit population to its subsistence level. This fear for insufficient food production
was based on the acceptance of the law of dirninishmg returns.1
According to this law the necessary increase in food production with given agricul-
tural techniques would force the use of a less efficiënt combination of labour and
capital on lands already under cultivation and/or the use of less fertile lands,
resulting in increasing costs per additional unit of agricultural output. It was also
generally believed among classical economists that there were few opportunities
in agriculture for division of labour and application of innovations, which could
be realized more easily in manufacturing where they result in increasing returns
per additional labourer.
Malthus' pessimism with regard to the race between decreasing returns in agricul-
ture and increasing returns in industry was shared by most economists at that time
(around 1800).
But pessimism gradually disappeared as in the second half of the 19th Century it
became obvious that the rapid development of technological knowledge and its
application in agriculture and manufacturing (introduction of new farming meth-
ods, new crops, improved transportation, économies of scale, division of labour,
etc.) did clear the way for a more than proportional growth of production, thus
sustaining the increase per capita output over a long period of time. In view of
these events it is compréhensible that economists lost their interest in population
questions and dit not further investigate possible links between population and
production. Consequently from then on in economie theory population growth was
treated as an independent variable.
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2. The Stagnationists
In the 1930's the thoughts of economists (Hansen a.o.) returned to the rôle of
population in economie theory.
This time however it was the lack of a sufficient rate of population growth that
worried them. In their theory of secular stagnation, autonomous Investment, which
was thought to be a very important income generating factor, was assumed to be
dependent on:
1. the rate of resource discovery
2. the rate of technological progress
3. the rate of population growth
All of these factors showed a slowdown in growth at that time, which contributed
to the fear that entrepreneurs would expect narrower markets and declining
profits with as a conséquence a décline in the growth of autonomous Investment.
A less rapid population growth was believed to influence this process because of
the resulting decrease in demand for housing facilities and public utilities. The
demand for these two items in particular requires considérable amounts of in-
vestment.
Critics of this theory pointed out that although in the past population growth
had absorbed a great deal of savings, population increase is not necessarily essential
for the absorption of these savings. Population oriented investment can also be
replaced by other forms of investment. In other words, the composition of invest-
ment may change, but not the quantity.
Now it is interesting to note that in this theory the population factor is treated
as a variable influencing the demand side of the economy whereas in Malthusian
thinking it was associated with the production side (diminishing returns). Neverthe-
less population remained an independent variable. It was only drawn into the
discussions because it evidently played a rôle in an economie process leading to
stagnation.
3. The Leibenstein/Nelson thesis
After the Second World War increasing awareness of the growth problems of the
under-developed nations and their extremely rapid increases in population have
revived interest in population questions among economists. In the 1950% Leiben-
stein and R. Nelson2 considered the population factor as a dependent variable in
their thesis of the so-called low level equilibrium trap3 and the minimum critical
effort.4 They assumed a functional relationship between rising per capita income
and changes in population growth rates. In this economic:demographic develop-
ment process four stages were identified.
In the first stage (subsistence level of income combined with high mortality and
fertiliry) children contribute to food production whereas the cost of rearing them
is very low. In the second stage death rates tend to fall with growing per capita
incomes but birth rates lag behind because it takes time for social attitudes to
adapt to changes (the realization lag, as Leibenstein named it). Birth rates may
even rise because the ratio of productive to non-productive years per child in
the first instance increases. This raises the value of a child as a source of family
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income and as a source of old age security. In the third stage a level of per capita
income is reached where there is a clear décline in the value of the marginal child
as a source of family income because the age up to which children are trained and
kept out of the labour force gradually rises. The utility value is reduced to that of a
"consumption good' (from the economie point of view). Birth rates will fall con-
siderably, narrowing the gap between death and birth rates. This fall in birth rates
is of crucial importance because 'the more rapid the rate at which fertility décline
sets in, the lower the rate of induced population growth and the less the extent to
which population growth absorbs potential national income gains.'5 The fourth
stage finally shows an almost closed birth-death rate gap resulting in a modest
growth in population. Per capita income is considerably beyond the subsistance
level at the first stage. The economy has overcome the major obstacle to its growth,
i.e. the low level equilibrium trap.
The crux of the whole story is that Leibenstein and Nelson believed that only
beyond a certain level of per capita income the rate of population growth was
strongly negatively influenced thus clearing the way for sustained growth. Below
such a point, the Community would fall back to the Malthusian subsistence level
because population growth would swallow up the realized per capita income gains.
Altogether it is hardly surprising that Leibenstein and Nelson came up with their
theory since at that time it was clear that some developed countries (especially
Japan) had experienced this kind of démographie-économie development.
The impact of this theory on the thinking about growth problems of developing
countries was considérable. What these countries needed in order to escape sub-
sistence level was a rapid rise in per capita incomes within a short period of time.
And since increasing per capita incomes were believed to be strongly linked to
capital accumulation (savings) according to the populär Harrod-Domar model6,
the rieh countries could help to solve the growth problems of the poor ones by
sending large amounts of capital (and technological knowledge).
This development policy of a necessary mirümal critical effort or 'big push' as
Rosenstein-Rodan calls it7, is this a logical result of the awareness of the demo-
graphic-economic mechanism in the now industrialized world.
4. The Coale and Hoover study
Together with the refinement of economie models for planning purposes, the
population factor was introduced into such models. A macro-economie growth
model consists of a set of relationships among the key economie magnitudes of a
national economy. This model is constructed in such a way that the effects of
changes in any variable on all the other interrelated variables can be traced. It is
expressed as a set of équations with known or assumed coefficients of interrelation-
ships and the whole is susceptible to empirical application and testing.
Early macro-economie growth models assumed a population growth rate and then
treated it as a parameter, having an impact on the variables within the model but
not in turn determined by them. However in the Coale and Hoover study on
India8, population size and its rate of growth played a central rôle. Their aim was
to provide a quantitative estimate of the effect of a declining fertility on the growth
of per capita income. They assumed that a prime determinant of the rate of
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economie development is public outlays plus private Investment (F) and that the
amount of funds available for such outlays will depend on both the national income
(Y) and the level of average income per equivalent adult consumer
F is broken down into
a those outlays which equip or assist active producers and thus raise aggregate
output in a relatively direct and immédiate way and
b those which serve primarily the welfare of the population as a whole and have
characteristically a diluted, indirect effect on output.10
F, in turn, is related to the growth of national income via the incrémental develop-
mental outlay to output ratio — a sophistication of the more familiär incrémental
capital to output ratio — assumed 3 in base year 1956, but rising to 3.6 in the last
year, 1986, of the considered period.
F is increased during the 30 year period through a coefficient representing the
incrémental propensity to save (the proportion of extra income that is saved) which
was assumed to be 30%.
With these assumptions a décline in fertility (they assume a 50% réduction in birth
rates to be effectuated during the period) will lower the dependency ratio, meaning
that more people fall within the productive âge group. Thus total and per capita
income are raised. Since savings are assumed to be a function of this total and
of per capita income, these will also lise, thus inducing an increase in the available
public outlays plus private investment (F) which, in turn, leads to a further increase
in incomes.
The outcome of their calculations is that in the 30-year period the slower popula-
tion growth as a result of lower birth rates (death rates are assumed to be constant)
pro vides an income per capita some 38-50 percent higher than would occur with
stable fertility. A further 25 years of reduced fertility would yield an income per
capita about twice as high as with continued high fertility.11
Obviously in this model the change in âge structure served to accelerate the rise
in total national income and income per head because of two forces:
1 a larger proportion of income was available for growth expenditure.
2 the proportion of low-yielding or late yielding welfare expenditures in total
public outlays plus private investment was reduced.
5. Myrdal's critidsm
Myrdal finds fault with the Coale and Hoover model on a number of grounds.12
His criticism centres around their interprétation of the relationship between savings
and income.
In the first place, non-monetary savings are excluded which in India (the country
taken by Coale and Hoover to illustrate their theory) is however of gréât impor-
tance. In India there are three main savings sectors: the government, individual
small business and large enterprise. The personal sector accounts for about 45%
of total (monetary) savings, government for most of the rest and corporations,
for a small but growing share.13 For each of these sectors Coale and Hoover assume
that the increase in savings proportionately outdistances the increase in income
per head which is however open to doubt:
10 Kroniek van Afrika 1974/1
a. Government savings (through taxes and surpluses of public enterprises) depend
on many other factors than income per head. Progressive income tax rates play
a much ïess important rôle than they do in Western countries and are not effec-
tively enforced. The future amount of government savings dépends much more
on the kind of tax laws, the quality of the tax administration and the political
acceptability of the laws than on income per head.
b. The 30% marginal propensity to save is much too high for India; the assump-
tion of growing savings to income ratio for individuals is quite unrealistic because
of the évidence of a tendency to constancy of this ratio in other countries. If the
more realistic assumption of constant average propensity to save is introduced then
the superiority of the low-fertility projection (inducing a rise in per capita income
at the end of the period) is greatly reduced.
c. The amount of savings in the corporation sector dépends largely on the oppor-
tunities for profitable Investment which in turn dépends on a large number of
forces other than thé growth of income per head.
In view of thèse criticisms, Myrdal made a recalculation based on thé assumption
of a constant ratio of savings to income which reduced thé différence between
the high and lower fertility incomes by two-thirds!
A second fundamental objection concerns the proportion of funds devoted to
welfare expenditures. Policies in this field, especially those relating to thé capital-
intensive sectors of housing and construction and thé dispersai or concentration
of towns and industries can hâve varying effects on économie growth. Thèse
variations in policy influence thé capital output ratio of the welfare expenditures
and the proportion of funds that can be allocated to direct growth Investment.
Clearly different types of policies open up a substantially wider range of income
différences between high and lower birth rates.
Leaving out this policy aspect and thereby presenting a highly simplified, mechan-
istic working of the System of relations is misleading and can hardly be considered
as a step forward in the économie-démographie field of knowledge.
There is another important objection according to Myrdal. The analysis is set in
the frame of the relationship between capital input and product output. It is in-
herently biased towards overemphasis on Investment and towards abstraction
from other growth generating conditions and thus towards isolation from all policy
aspects. In fact, the very simplistic Harrod-Domar équation which links economie
growth to only two factors i.e. the savings to income ratio and the marginal capital
output ratio, is accepted as being a relevant theory. This, however, is easy to under-
stand since in discussions of growth problems of the Third World, the Harrod-
Domar 'model' was widely accepted in those years (beginning of the 1960's).
Nevertheless this concept hampers or rather prevents considération and measure-
ment of e.g. the effect of different levels of consumption on labour input and labour
efficiency.
Also the acceptance of capital rather than labour as a powerful income generating
force is not surprising since we have seen that af ter Malthus' time (± 1820) in-
come per head in fact could steadily rise because of a process of capital accumula-
tion that made possible considérable increases in the labour productivity. However,
statistical findings, published in the 1960's on the interplay of economie and
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démographie factors has influencée existing views to a great extent. Kuznets
examined the relationship between per capita product and population growth
through a corrélation of these two variables for 40 underdeveloped countries in
the period 1950-1964 and concluded 'that the rate of population growth, among
the underdeveloped countries has no uniform effect on growth in the per capita
product. The variety of combinations is wide, and it is this mixture of relations
that naturally produces an insignificant corrélation.14 Although statistical corréla-
tions do not help us to distinguish determining factors clearly, they can at least
serve to exclude claims to primacy for single factors whose effects do not prove
dominant in the empirical data. Easterlin also found the same insignificant
corrélation coefficient comparing the two variables for 27 developing countries.15
One other important fact came out of these empirical studies. They showed that
the theoretically direct relationship between capital formation (or savings) and
growth of output (Leibenstein, Harrod-Domar, Coale and Hoover) lacked statis-
tical support. On the contrary, several studies showed the relatively modest con-
tribution of capital and labour in the proces of economie growth. Kendrick16
emphasized the relatively small contribution made since 1920 by increases in
capital per worker, in contrast with the great contributions made by 'bidden
investments' such as the improvements in human productive capacity. Kuznets in
another study concludes: 'The scanty available data suggest that increase in inputs
per head of manhours and material capital combined, accounted for less than one
fifth of the secular rise in production per capita in western countries.17 Also Solow
observed 'that capital formation is not the only source of growth in productivity.
Investment is at best a necessary condition for growth, surely not a sufficient one.
Recent study has indicated the importance of such activities as research, éducation,
and public health'.18 Denison, tried to fully allocate the growth of output in the
u.s. among the relevant factors such as the level of éducation of the labour force,
length of working days, économies of scale, spread of knowledge etc. and reached
similar conclusions.19
Summarizing: this lack of knowledge about the contribution of spécifie variables
and their quantitative meaning for growth processes illustrâtes the 'relatively
primitive state of the art that prevails in the linking of démographie and economie
variables'.20
6. The neo-Malthusian approach
In spite of the statistical findings and theoretical progress in relation to demo-
graphic-economic interrelations; in spite also of the growing awareness of the great
complexity of the matter among researchers; textbook writers and politicians in
particular very often present the whole problem in the form of the so-called neo-
malthusian version in arguing their désire to take birth-control measures. Their
arguments can be summarized in the following formula
K = r (p + y)
Where K is required rate of growth of capital
r is the incrémental capital output ratio (assumed to be a constant)
p is the population growth rate and
y the desired rate of increase in per capita income.
12 Kroniek van Afrika 1974/1
te*,.
Assuming that population is increasing by 2% per year and r = 3, then 6 per cent
of the national income must be saved and invested to maintain the present level
of income per head. If an increase in per capita income of 2°/o is desired then 12%
of the national income must be saved and invested, and if at the same time popula-
tion is growing at the rate of 3 per cent instead of 2, then Investment up to 15
per cent of the national income is required. This means that current consumption
by households would have to be reduced in order to achieve the high rate of
capital formation required. The 'model' shows that the higher the rate of growth of
population the greater the material capital requirements needed to sustain the
same rate of growth per worker and per capita product since a larger labour force
(because of more rapid population growth) will require more capital just to keep
its productivity from falling to a rate relative to the previous period (with slower
population growth rate). Assuming further constant returns to scale and a given
capital output ratio, the model is believed (other conditions assumed to be re-
maining equal,) to provide a simple picture of the influence of less rapidly growing
population on the economy.
7. Kuznets' criticism of the New Malthusian approach
In two articles Kuznets 21 sharply criticized the methodological framework, which
in his view makes the entire analysis misleading. The effect of a higher rate of
population growth is not only to require a larger share of total product to be
devoted to capital formation but it also changes thé âge structure. The larger




















80.94 74.82 86.70 80.69
1. Assumed rate of growth of population, % per year 1.0 3.0 1.0 3.0
2. Assumed rate of growth of per capita product, % per year 2.0 2.0 0.1 0.1
3. Rate of growth of total net product, % per year (from
lines l and 2)
4. Net capital investment required as % of net product
(Incrémental net capital-output ratio, ICOR, assumed
to be 3.0)
5. Government consumption as % of net product (assumed)
6. Private consumer expenditures as % of net product (100
minus lines 4 and 5)
Age Structure of Population (based on UN selected data)
Total population = 100
7. 0-14 years old
8. 15-64 years old
9. 65 and over
10. Equivalent consumer units (lines 7 and 9 weighted by 0.6;
line 8 by 1.0)
11. Private consumer expenditures, % of total net product
percentile of équivalent consumer units (line 6 + line 10)
12. Total net product (assuming output of 100 per worker,
i.e., per member of line 8)













85.6 82.4 85.6 82.4
0.946 0.908 1.013 0.979
6,400 5,600 6,400 5,600
60.54 50.85 64.83 54.82
Meilink/The population factor in economie growth theory 13
proportion of the population in âges under 15 means a larger burden of dependen-
cy and thus, ceteris paribus, tends to lower per capita output.
But this is partly offset by the lower consumer requirements per head of the young.
Therefore the term 'equivalent consumer units' is introduced.22 Kuznets assigns
a weight of 0.6 for âges under 15 and over 65 and a weight of 1.0 to the population
in the working age-group. He proceeds to compute the effects of a more rapid
population growth (from l to 3 per cent) on per capita consumption and capital
requirements within the neo-malthusian framework. The assumed incrémental
capital output ratio is 3. (see table)23
His conclusion is as follows: 'The calculations suggest that raising the rate of
population growth from l to 3% per year can presumably be accomodated by a
réduction of about 15% in consumption per unit. Likewise with a given population
growth rate, raising the rate of increase in per capita income from 0.1 to 2.0%
apparently reduces per unit consumption only about 7% which would be made up
m about three years!'
These results are puzzling and, as Kuznets remarks, cast doubt upon the adequacy
of the underlying analytical structure because one may ask why, if this is a realistic
model of economie growth, so few countries have become developed, for surely
the sacrifice of a small fraction of growing consumption would hardly tax the
capacity of the least developed économies and societies.
Neo-Malthusian analysis in one sense is clearly deficiënt because again it assumes
that physical capital is the sole agent inducing growth of per capita product. Since
capital formation is only a small fraction of total output, major changes in the
former mean but minor changes in a large component of total output, such as
consumption, and these minor changes can consequently work seeming miracles
in the way of producing economie growth. No wonder Kuznets concludes, 'that a
wholly unrealistic picture of the possibilliti.es, and of the problems associated with
population and economie growth is presented'.24
He continues by examining the effects of a more rapid population growth rate on
consumption when capital output ratio is not constant but variable, justifying this
assumption with the following argument. At certain stages of growth items usually
classified under consumption such as health and nutrition may be crucial to eco-
nomie growth, and thus have the status of capital Investment. And both the con-
vential and expanded capital to output ratio are influenced by prevailing economie
and social institutions and are not fixed by technology except within broad limits.
Varying the incrémental capital output ratio from 3 to 5 results in an increase of
about 100% in the réduction of per consumer consumption associated with an
annual rate of population growth, of either l or 3 per cent. If it is raised to 10
there is a fourfold and a five-and-a-half fold increase in the réduction of consump-
tion associated with respectively, l and 3 per cent population growth.
In view of these findings, Kuznets remarks that, 'the values to be used in measuring
the effects of a high rate of growth of per capita product — for a given country
at a given time — cannot be determined mechanically. No matter how rough the
result will be, it does require the examination of all the conditions affecting the
economie efficiency of a given country. And obviously these conditions include
economie and social factors complementary to but not identical to the déterminants
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embodied even in the wider définition of capital in its relation to output. These
factors should not be neglected and yet they are outside the conventional limits
of the economie discipline'.25 Thus an adequate analysis of the problems of rela-
tions between high rates of population growth, capital requirements, dependency
ratio's, consumption levels and the like, would have to be extended to cover signi-
ficantly different economie and social groups within the underdeveloped countries.
8. Boserup's approach.
A step in this direction was made by Mrs. Boserup.26 She divided the (African)
economy into three sectors. First, the sector located in the most backward régions
where people produce for their own subsistence and try to earn some money by
means of migrant labour. In these often sparsely populated areas the lack of incen-
tives to produce an agricultural surplus is not due to land shortage but to the
absence of local markets and of transport facilities. In these circumstances the
motivation of the people to have large families is quite rational. Young men are
needed as migratory money earners. Moreover, these young men have to clear
the land under the System of shifting cultivation, while young women are needed to
do a large part of the agricultural work and to raise more children. Another reason
for this high birth rate is found in the existence of a very high infant mortality rate.
The second sector is that of cash cropping and subsistence food production which
has a less extensive System of land use. Fallow periods are usually shorter and
erop rotation Systems are more often applied. This sector is partly monetized,
there are more schools, and health conditions are better which results in a lower
death rate. However birth rates are still high and this implies that in this sector
population is growing fast. Large numbers of youths, having received a few years
of schooling look for non-manual jobs in the urban centres. In this sector to have
many children may be advantageous because the cultivation of cash crops some-
times yields a good income, but this cultivation of cash crops is a very risky
activity since crops may fail or priées collapse. In such conditions having one or
more members of the family in salaried employment is a kind of family insurance
against bad times. Clearly, the question of how population growth is related to
output growth in this sector has everything to do with wprld market priées and the
international trade structure. These factors should not be left out in an adequate
analysis of relationships.
The third sector is the modern, fully monetized, industriell sector situated around
the capital of the country or around big ports. These urban areas undergo an
enormous growth in numbers of 5 to 6°/o annually because of the large migratory
flows from rural areas. This growth of the labour force créâtes sévère employment
problems. But simply linking thèse employment difficulties to excess population
growth is incorrect.
The industrialization process can be effectuated in a large number of ways in-
volving varying combinations of capital and labour. In actual fact production and
Investment décisions are to a large extent politically determined. For example, thé
prédominance of non-indigenous ownership and of expatriate prédominance in
higher technical and managerial staff regularly leads to choices of machinery and
technology reflecting thé preceding expérience and serving interests in advanced
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countries and thus neglecting more suitable (employment orientée!) choices. A
dualistic structure of economie sector (modern capital intensive manufacturing
versus stagnant low productive subsistence agriculture) may be the outcome.
9. Type of development
According to several authors, this unlinked development is not an unknown
phenomenon in the African countries of today. Robson and Lury27 state, 'This
growth (of the industrial sector) has frequently depended upon the establishment
of a few large scale projects. There are so far few signs of the émergence of a
balanced size distribution of industrial enterprises such as characterize developed
ar,eas. The tendency in Africa is for a few giant firms (state or expatriate generated)
to flourish amongst a large number of very small firms. Moreover thèse large
enterprises tend to remain enclaves. Their linkages with other branches of the
economy, either as markets for inputs or as suppliers of output for further proces-
sing, tend to be limited. It would be difficult to argue that much if any of the
industrial development which has so far taken place has thé propulsive character
of leading sectors'.
In the past few years several case studies of African countries on thé links between
thé growth of population and production have appeared.28 Most of them deal with
thé major policy question of thé implications of rapid population growth for thé
demand for housing, éducation, employment, health and social services. Some
also provide illustrations of the isolated development of national production growth
and population growth.
For example:
Cameroun29 Biyong examines, among other things, the thesis that growth of GDP
is only marginally related to population growth. After contrasting agricultural
output (subsistence and export population) of the six fédéral administrative provin-
ces with their respective population rates, he concludes that thé figures display
a lack of any concrète relationship. Growth of population appeared to exercise
little or no influence on thé growth of this sector's output. Other factors such as
development of land (only 20% of arable land is under cultivation at présent),
thé control of plant diseases, improved technology, and thé world market and
internai priée development are thought to be more determining forces.30 Concer-
ning thé manufacturing and commerce sector the same absence of corrélation
was observed. In this case thé existing large excess capacity in industry was
responsible. Growth of internai effective demand in thé considered period (1966-
'71) lays claim only to one third of this excess in production capacity. Biyong
relates this situation to thé export, outward oriented character of Cameroun's
industrial activities.31 Concerning this point thé ECA review report comments:
Toor people with little monetary income can participate only marginally, if at
all, in modem market structures and where population growth adds primarily to
this group it may not mean equal increases in effective markets for more modem
consumer items. Because of this, increases in thé effective buying power of con-
sumers can, percent for percent, have a greater effect on thé development of many
internai markets (and hence on manufacturing and commerce) than increases
in thé population itself.32 Related to this feature is the way investment funds are
1
16 Kroniek van Afrika 1974/1
el
formed. The growth of Investment depended on other factors than population
growth. High income families could save substantial amounts of sums whereas
the majority of the people had no savings at all. The country's Investment resources
were largely generated from savings in the public sector (taxes on major enterpri-
ses), saving by domestic private firms and foreign public and/or private funds.33
Algeria: In Tabah's study the same weak association between GDP growth and
population growth is registrated. The rapid growth in national production was
largely due to the petroleum and natural gas exports, to the growth of a complex
modern industry and the extension of modern agricultural production in all of
which capital intensive production methods were used requiring relatively small
amounts of skilled labour.34
Ethiopia: The Bekele and Bondestam study among other things, provides projec-
tions of population and income to illustrate that growing income differentials
between urban and rural areas of the country will occur. When trends are extra-
polated the GNP per capita of the total population rises from Eth. $ 156 in 1968
to Eth. $ 480 in 1998. But income in the subsistence agriculture areas will only
modestly grow from Eth. $ 75 in 1968 to Eth. $ 116 in 1998.3s
In Zambia according to the ECA Report 700 European families accounted for
71% of agricultural sales in 1964. The remaining 29% was contributed by roughly
450 000 African families.36 This illustrâtes again the absence of a direct relation
between the majority of the Zambian population and the growth of production.
These brief illustrations serve to indicate that an adequate économie-démographie
study should involve an analysis of the type of development that has been realized
in spécifie countries.
Another important point is the student's implicit perception of population prob-
lems. 'One can look at a crowded gheto and say the poverty and poor health of its
inhabitants are products of ovér-population. Therefore the reproductive behavior
of the poor should be changed. Or, one can say these people would be neither
poor nor sickly nor crowded if they could get the kind of social acceptance, jobs
and incomes that would enable them to have better housing, food and health care.
In other words, how poverty and poor people are perceived makes all the différ-
ence. Likewise the notion of over-population is more a matter of perception and
value judgement than of empirical data'.37
That the exact nature of the économie-démographie links is also, to a certain ex-
tent, the result of a country's ability to organize itself in order to deal with a fast-
growing population, is proved by the Chinese. According to Aziz38 some basic
characteristics of their system are:
1. The ability to mobilize the unemployed and under-employed labour force for
improving the land, building dikes, and dams, digging irrigation channels, con-
structing roads and simply cultivating the land more intensively.
2. The ability to diversify its activities — first within the agricultural sector to
forestry, fisheries, and animal husbandry and then to small industries, using
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agricultural raw materials or providing inputs for agriculture. Local communities
do not have to wait for government or industrial entrepreneurs to bring industries
to their areas. They develop these industries according to their own needs and
priorities, train their own workers, and keep the extra value that this process
créâtes. This permits a graduai structural change in the rural economy that is in
line with the factor endowment (a surplus of labour in relation to financial capital)
and provides a step-by-step technological change.
3. The government's décision to feed the people and meet the other basic needs
before mobilizing any surplus from it. The surplus created was used to modernize
thé structure of thé local community itself rather than shifted to a few urban
centres.
4. The strong différence in thé System of planning as compared to that followed
in many other deveioping countries. In the latter all targets are determined in a
national plan and their achievement is sought through a combination of large
public investments in expensive irrigation and infrastructure projects, and économ-
ie policies to influence private sector décisions. The primary merit of the Chinese
System of planning is its emphasis on maximum exploitation of local resources
for meeting local needs. Central planners are seldom able to identify all the poten-
tialities for local development, and to establish the right order of priorities.
Aziz concludes, 'The startling fact is that China has within a short period of 24
years already abolished absolute poverty, unemployment and inflation'.39 This
development process was possible despite thé fact that thé Chinese population
increased with an average of 2% yearly during the 1960-70 décade.40
The above points are not made to say that population problems are easily solved
by simply copying the Chinese strategy. However they do illustrate that studying
population questions is a more (complicated) exercise than just assuming some
highly simplistic macro-économie formula.
Conclusion: This brief review of economie thinking on the population question
shows that the macro-economie apparatus used in growth théories by itself is still
insufficiently developed in order to handle this very complex problem. A study of
the relationship between démographie and economie factors should include some
broader aspects of social organization in addition to the familiär economie varia-
ables.
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